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Licensure of Health Care
Professionals: The Consumer's Case
for Abolition
Charles H. Baron*
ABSTRACT
While state medical licensure laws ostensibly are intended to promote
worthwhile goals, such as the'maintenance of high standards in health
care delivery, this Article argues that these laws in practice are detrimen-
tal to consumers. The Article takes the position that licensure contributes
to high medical care costs and stifles competition, innovation and con-
sumer autonomy. It concludes that delicensure would expand the range
of health services available to consumers and reduce patient dependency,
and that these developments would tend to make medical practice more
satisfying to consumers and providers of health care services.
I don't know that I cared much about these osteopaths until I
heard you were going to drive them out of the State; but since I
heard this I haven't been able to sleep .... Now what I contend is
that my body is my own, at least I have always so regarded it. If I
do harm through my experimenting with it, it is I who suffer, not
the State.
Mark Twain
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-two years ago, economist Milton Friedman said of medical
licensure:
I am myself persuaded that licensure has reduced both the quan-
tity and the quality of medical practice; that it has reduced the
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1961; Ph.D.
in Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 1972. Consumer's Advocate, Community Legal
Services, Philadelphia, Pa., 1968-70; Executive Director, Resource Center for Consumers of
Legal Services, Washington, D.C., 1975-77; Member, Board of Directors, Omnidentix, Inc.
(for-profit franchisor of dental centers). The author gives special thanks to Lynne Spigelmire
and Jennifer Parks for their research assistance during the preparation of this article.
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opportunities available to people who would like to be physicians,
forcing them to pursue occupations they regard as less attractive;"
that it has forced the public to pay more for less satisfactory
medical service, and that it has retarded technological develop-
ment both in medicine itself and in the organization of medical
practice. I conclude that licensure should be eliminated as a re-
quirement for the practice of medicine.!
At the time, Friedman's idea might have seemed a shocking example of the
Social Darwinistic extremes to which too much devotion to free market
economics could lead. But one need not subscribe to the theories of the
Chicago school of economics to conclude that the time has come to do away
with medical licensure. Michael Pertschuk, a Federal Trade Commissioner
and long-time consumer advocate, added his voice five years ago to Profes-
sor Friedman's:
Licensing boards, dominated by members of the profession, may
act like any other cartel ....
[L]ike medieval guilds, the licensed professions can maintain
their privileged positions regardless of market forces. Study after
study has shown that licensing results in higher direct costs to
consumers. Indirect costs, in the form of foregone innovation and
experimentation are higher still. 2
This Article attempts to show that the disadvantages of maintaining a
regime of health care licensure far outweigh the advantages. It traces this
country's history of experimentation with licensure and examines how
licensure has contributed to increasing health care costs. It argues that
licensure has failed its goal of protecting the consumer of medical services
from low quality medical care, and instead limits the consumer's freedom
to choose alternative services which may be more effective as well as less
expensive than those now available. The Article then discusses how mod-
ern medical care institutions might respond to delicensure and to these
alternative services, and identifies forces presently at work in our society
which make the abolition of licensure a realistic possibility.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF PROFESSIONAL HEALTH CARE
LICENSURE
Licensure of health care professionals in the United States is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, dating only from the late nineteenth and early
1 M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 158 (1962).
2 Pertschuk, Professional Licensure, 43 CONN. MED. 793, 794 (1979).
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twentieth centuries.3 Prior efforts to regulate the practice of medicine in
the United States had failed. 4 Shryock, a defender of medical licensure,
described the period before licensure gained popularity:
Unfortunately, the promise of early American [physician licen-
sure] la~s proved illusory, and for a half a century after 1820
licensing requirements apparently deteriorated. By the 1850s ...
the situation in the United States seemed to be approaching its
nadir ....
[S]ectarian colleges-homeopathic, eclectic, "botanic"-
invaded the country after 1830 and did battle with "regular"
schools of any type. Obviously, ill-informed legislatures still
thought one sort of medical practice as promising as another: a
practical and equalitarian people could decide for themselves
which type was most effective. When doctors protested against
irregular practice they were accused of seeking a monopoly for
their own benefit. Dr.' N. S. Davis later claimed that the sects
invented this accusation after 1840, in their crusade for medical
freedom as analogous to religious freedom, but the evidence for
earlier distrust of monopoly is clear enough. The sectarians doubt-
less stirred up old fears, condemning what they termed "orthodox
intolerance." Moreover, the more learned sects-homeopathy and
eclecticism-eould then make a better plea for heresy on' medical
grounds than was to be the case a few decades later. 5
The limited success of early licensure initiatives might have been due in
part to legislators' lack of information about different approaches to medi-
cal care, but it certainly reflected as well'the character of the American
people of the period. In the 1830's, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "The
inhabitant of the United States learns from birth that he must rely on
himself to combat the ills and ,trials of life .... [H]e is restless and defiant in
his outlook toward the authority of society and appeal~ to its power only
when he cannot do without it."6
3 R. SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA 1650-1965, at 45-49 (1967). See also B.
SHIMBERG, B. ESSER, & D. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 12-16
(1972); R. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES 7-12
(1969); Sigerist, The History of Medical Licensure, 104 J. A.M.A. 1057 (1935).
4 R. SHRYOCK, supra note 3, at 17-27.
5 [d. at 27-29.
6 A. DE TOCQUEVIllE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 189 (1969). John Stuart Mill captured this
pervasive sense of personal autonomy:
[T]he sole end for which' mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection, That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be com-
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This attitude of personal autonomy eventually yielded. 7 As scientific
progress accelerated, health care delivery took forms which seemed beyond
the means and capacities of the common man. The benefits of the new
technology seemed available only at the cost of delegating decisions previ-
ously made by the individual to an elite corps of specially-trained techno-
crats. In his recent book, sociologist Paul Starr described the shifting mood:
[By the mid-nineteenth century,] American politics and culture
had undergone a deep change. The American faith in democratic
simplicity and common sense yielded to a celebration of science
and efficiency .... Both the Jacksonians and the Progressives
esteemed science, but they understood it in different ways: The
Jacksonians saw science as knowledge that could be widely and
easily diffused, while the Progressives were reconciled to its com-
plexity and inaccessibility .... The assumptions of radicals, re-
formers and conservatives reflected the more general decline of
confidence in the ability of the laymen to deal with their own
physical and personal problems. The home medical advisors of
the early twentieth century, unlike their predecessors a half cen-
tury earlier, concentrated mainly on everyday hygiene and first
aid. By the Progressive era, to call for popular autonomy in heal-
ing was to endanger one's own credibility. The public granted the
legitimate complexity of medicine and the need for in-
stitutionalized professional authority.8
Shimberg observes that licensure has been a transcendent phenomenon in
the health professions since the beginning of the twentieth century: "Be-
tween 1910 and 1920, approximately 130 laws were passed regulating 14
health-related occupations. By 1970, 13 of these health-related occupations
were being regulated by all fifty states."9
Physician licensure has reflected in large part a consumer willingness
to entrust complex medical decisions to medical professionals. Licensure
has in turn permitted the medical profession to monopolize the delivery of
health care services, and to limit the scope of services that non-M.D.s can
provide. lo Although the profession's primary motive may have been the
pelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make
him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right
. . . . In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (1978).
7 R. SHRYOCK, supra note 3, at 47-48, 59-61.
8 P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A
SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 140-41 (1982).
9 B. SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A PuBLIC PERSPECTIVE 15-17 (1980).
10 Gellhorn, The Abuse ofOccupatio7Ul.l Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 11 (1976). See also E.
RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN
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protection of the public, licensing laws have protected the profession as
well. As Professor Gellhorn has pointed out:
Licensing has only infrequently been imposed upon an occupation
against its wishes. Unwelcomed licensure has indeed occurred
.... In many more instances, however, licensing has been eagerly
sought-always on the purported ground that licensure protects
the uninformed public against incompetence or dishonesty, but
invariably with the consequences that members of the licensed
group become protected against competition from newcomers. 11
Licensure has prevented non-M.D.s from competing freely in the market
for medical services and has unreasonably restricted the variety of such
services that is available to consumers. 12 Because of its anticompetitive
tendencies, licensure has produced higher health care costs than those
which would prevail in a competitive market. 13 Indeed, medical expendi-
tures in the United States have soared astronomically in recent years.
Health care expenditures accounted in 1982 for 10.5% of the Gross Na-
tional Product,14 compared with 5.3% in 1960.15 Of the $322 billion spent
on health care in 1982, public sources contributed 42%; consumers paid
$175 billion directly or in conjunction with employers in the form of health
insurance premiums.16 The 1982 per capita expenditure for health care
amounted to $1,365,17 or nearly ten times the amount spent per person in
1960.18
Government has responded with layer upon layer of regulation de-
signed to control costs. Since 1964, three out of four states have established
"certificate of need" programs to regulate capital expenditures by health
care facilities. The federal government has established health resource
planning programs, and provides funding for state and local health plan-
ning agencies, which have substantial power to influence health care financ-
ing and spending decisions. Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement poli-
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1967); M. FRIEDMAN,supra nole 1, at 137-160; Kessel, Price Discrimina-
tion in Medicine, I J.L. & ECON. 20 (1958).
11 Gellhom, supra note 10, at 11.
l2See Rayack,MedicaILicensure: Social Costs arul Social Benejits, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 147,
152-54 (1983).
13 Frech, The Lung-Lost Free Market in Health Care, in A NEW ApPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS
OF HEALTH CARE 57 (M. Olson ed. 1981); see also M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 155 (other
social costs). See generaUy P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 322-28 (1979).
14 Gibson, Waldo & Levit, National Health Expendilures, 1982,5 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 1,
19 (1983).
15Id. at 4; see Factors Responsible for Increasing Cost of Medical Care, 44 CONN. MED. 447
(1980).
16 Gibson, Waldo & Levit, supra note 14, at 1.
17 [d.
16 The per capita expenditure in 1960 was $146. [d. at 4.
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cies and participation requirements are also integral parts of the govern-
ment's cost containment strategy.19
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has initiated nu-
merous challenges to anticompetitive practices in the medical profession.
The FTC recently secured a judgment barring the American Medical
Association and its state affiliates from forbidding member doctors from
advertising. 20 It obtained consent orders against medical groups which
boycotted health maintenance organizations,21 and brought suit against a
state medical society for attempting by boycott to set fees paid by Blue
Shield and the state Medicaid program for medical services.22 Yet, through
a massive and enormously well-financed lobbying effort, physicians re-
cently came perilously close to accomplishing passage of federal legislation
exempting the established professions from FTC jurisdiction.23
Despite recent efforts on both federal and state levels to promote
competition in the medical establishment, the profession has been largely
successful in staving off threats to its monopoly power. Eliminating state
licensing requirements, however, would be an effective strategy. Delicen-
sure would permit competitive market forces to control health care costs
and provide the additional benefits of better care and greater consumer
choice. Moreover, it might have consequences of direct benefit to prac-
titioners themselves. 24
III. THE DISADVANTAGES OF LICENSURE
In light of the enormous cost of medical care it is important to consider
whether the intended benefits of licensure, if they have indeed mater-
ialized, outweigh its costs.
The argument for licensure is comprised of two elements. First, con-
sumers of medical services are considered simply too ignorant to protect
themselves from the harmful, even fatal consequences of seeking help
from quacks, frauds and charlatans.25 Second, it is believed that the most
effective way to protect consumers from their own poor judgment is to
restrict their range of choice by means of a system of Iicensure.26
19 Wing & Craige, Health Care Regulation: Dilemma ofa Partially Deuelaped Public Policy, 57
N.C.L. REv. 1165,1166(1979).
20 American Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 455 U.S. 676 (1982), reh'g denied 456 U.S. 966 (1982).
21 See, e.g., Medical Servo Corp. of Spokane County, 88 F.T.C. 906 (1976); Forbes Health
Sys. Med. Staff, 94 F.T.C. 1042 (1979).
22 In re Michigan State Med. Soc'y, TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) ~ 21,991 (1983).
23 The McClure-Melcher bill was tabled in the Senate, 128 CONGo REc. S15,069-80
(daily ed. Dec. 16, 1982).
24 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
25 Hogan, The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, Evidence, and Recommendations, 7 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 117, 117 (1983).
26 See Frech, supra note 13, at 47.
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Through limiting lawful practice to practitioners who have met the
"minimum standards" set by the medical profession, licensure is supposed
to protect "the sick and injured against exploitation by unqualified prac-
titioners ...."27 State licensure authorities are responsible for assuring that
physicians are capable of practicing in a "satisfactory manner."28 Although
each state has different licensure requirements, three universal qualifica-
tions are: "[t]he high moral and ethical character of the candidate, the
successful completion of the medical curriculum of an approved medical
school, and a passing grade on a licensure examination."2u Thus, it is the
combination of medical school training and medical board regulation
which is supposed to ensure maintenance of minimum standards in the
general practice of medicine.30
Licensure, however, has not produced the desired gains in the quality
of health care, in large measure because the profession itself controls the
licensure mechanism. A growing body of evidence indicates that the profes-
sion's record for effectively policing itself has been less than stellar.3l There
is also concern that any benefits attributable to licensure have not persisted.
On the one hand, medical schools and licensing boards successfully bar
entry to individuals who lack the basic technical skills for competent prac-
tice;32 yet, once a person is admitted, medical boards are far less effective at
monitoring a physician's continued competency.33
Unlike other systems of credentialing, such as certification,34 licensure
not only sets standards of practice, but also excludes from the market
practitioners who do not meet these standards. Under a system of certifica-
27 Annas, The Case for Medical Licensure, 8 MEDICOLEGAL NEWS 20 (1980). See also
A. MORITZ & R. MORRIS, HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE 134-35 (1970); R. DERBYSHIRE, supra
note 3. But see Baram, Managing Risks to Health, Safety and Environment by the Use ofAlternatives to
Regulation, 16 NEW ENG. L. REv. 657, 663-64 (1981).
28 Holden & Levit, Medical Education, Licensure and the National Board of Medical Examiners,
303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1357, 1358 (1980).
29 CniIrtblett, National Policies for Medical Licensure Through the Federation of State Medical
Boards, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1360 (1980).
30 Id.
31 See Hogan, supra note 25, at 121-33; F. GRAD & N. MARTI, PHYSICIANS LICENSURE AND
DISCIPLINE: THE LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 115-116, 126,
128, 130 (1979).
32 Id. at 74-139.
33 "At the present time, recertification programs have had little effect on physician
competence. Specialty boards are the primary regulators of competence in medical specialties,
but only four have active recertification programs, and two of these programs are voluntary
...." Id. at 95. "The failures of effective enforcement and of physicians to report the
improper practices of colleagues both reflect certain self-protective professional attitudes." Id.
at 115.
34 See Havighurst & King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust
Perspective (pt. 1), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 132-33 (1983); see also infra notes 70-71 and accompany-
ing text.
HeinOnline -- 9 Am. J.L. and Med. 342 1983-1984
342 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 9 NO.3
tion, such as that which presently exists for medical specialties, the con-
sumer is allowed to decide for himself whether to take his medical problem
to a licensed physician who is a certified specialist or leave it to one who is a
general practitioner. But it is a crime for someone who has not been
licensed as a physician to deliver medical services which the licensure laws
reserve to physicians. In practice, this has meant that consumers may not
select, for example, the services of nurse-midwives over those of obstetri-
cians or the services of nurse-practitioners over those of general practice
physicians unless the nurse is willing to risk fine, imprisonment, and loss of
the limited license to practice as a nurse. 35
Licensure also inhibits experimentation with alternative modes of de-
livering medical services. These may be experimental, unconventional or
simply unorthodox. Competition from these alternative modes could de-
crease the costs and, perhaps, increase the quality of medical services.
Consider the case of Andrews v. Ballard,36 a class action by a group of
consumers in Texas charging that the State Board of Medical Examiners
had unconstitutionally infringed upon the plaintiffs' right to choose
acupuncture as a form of therapy. Andrews dramatizes the effectiveness of
licensure as an anticompetitive device. Prior to 1974, acupuncture prac-
titioners had been available to consumers in Texas, because the Texas
Medical Licensing Board had not applied the broad language of its medical
practice act37 to the practice of acupuncture. But in the early 1970's, when
consumers displayed a growing interest in acupuncture, the American
Medical Association and the licensing board took steps to protect licensed
physicians from increased competition.38
35 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 74A (West 1983). The certification require-
ments and limits of nursing practice are interpreted by the Massachusetts Board of Nursing
Discipline and Registration to mean that a nurse could have her license revoked if she were
discovered to be practicing medicine. Nurses are limited in their practice to counseling,
advising, and implementing orders and medication prescribed by physicians, dentists and
podiatrists, and must work under the supervision of a physician. Telephone interview with
Eleanor Burke, Executive Secretary, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Nursing
Discipline and Registration, in Boston (March I, 1983).
36 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
37 Any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine within the meaning of this
law: (I) who shall publicly profess to be a physician or surgeon and shall diagnose,
treat or offer to treat, any disease or disorder, mental or physical, or any physical
deformity or injury, by any system or method, to effect cures thereof, (2) or who shall
diagnose, treat, or offer to treat any disorder, mental or physical, or any physical
deformity or injury by any system or method and to effect cures thereof and charge
therefor, directly or indirectly, money or other compensation ....
[d. at 1039 n.3.
36 [d. at 1041 n.9. The text of the AMA resolution read:
Resolved, that it is the current judgment of the American Medical Association that
since the practice of acupuncture in tl.e United States is an experimental medical
procedure it should be performed in a research setting by a licensed physician or
under his direct supervision and responsibility, and therefore the AMA urges its
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On December 2, 1974, the board issued a policy statement which
announced that acupuncture constituted the practice of medicine
within the meaning of the Texas Medical Practice Act; that
acupucture was an "experimental procedure," the safety and ef-
fectiveness of which had not been established; that although
"acupuncture practice by licensed physicians not be absolutely
prohibited, safeguards" were necessary to protect the public; that
the practice of acupuncture by anyone who was not a licensed
physician would constitute the unlicensed practice of medicine;
and that any licensed physician delegating the authority to per-
form acupuncture to an unlicensed person would be subject to
action against his license for unprofessional conduct and the lend-
ing of a license to practice medicine. 311
In October, 1975, the board disciplined two physicians who had allowed
non-physicians to practice acupuncture under their supervision. The board
initially ordered cancellation of the physicians' licenses to practice medi-
cine, but later reduced the sanction to ten years probation.
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas declared
the state board's actions unconstitutional in light of the burden }'Vhich they
placed on the plaintiffs' right of privacy. The court recognized that Texas
could regulate the practice of acupuncture because of the state's interest in
its citizens' health and well-being. The court went on to say:
[Texas] is well-advised to protect that interest by assuring that
both formally trained and formally untrained practitioners know
what they are doing. That, however, is not what Texas has done. It
has prohibited the formally trained from practicing, but has al-
lowed [to practice] the formally untrained, who it admits "are not
schooled enough In acupuncture to effectively supervise
acupuncturists."4o
The Board had seized for the medical profession the sole power to practice
acupuncture, though not a single physician in the state of Texas had the
competence to practice it. Consumers were foreclosed from the opportu-
nity to seek services from trained acupuncturists because acupuncturists
were not licensed physicians.4t In effect, the board had effectively denied
constituent state and territorial associations to seek appropriate legislation and rules
and regulations to confine the performance of acupuncture to such research seuings.
Resolution 55, House of Delegates of the American Medical Association.
39 498 F. Supp. at 1040-41. In January, 1976, the board formally reconsidered its De-
cember, 1974 policy statement in response 10 claims that it could not rule by w~y of such
statements. Although it took no evidence and heard no testimony, the board reissued the
statement as a set of formal rules having the force of law. [d.
40 [d. at 1055.
41 [d. at 1056.
HeinOnline -- 9 Am. J.L. and Med. 344 1983-1984
344 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 9 NO.3
Texas consumers the opportunity to obtain acupuncture from anyone.
This, the court held, overly burdened the consumer's right to choose
among medical therapies-a right encompassed by the constitutional right
of privacy.42
While Andrews prohibited the complete foreclosure of a field of prac-
tice to those trained in that practice, licensure boards may still favor
traditional practices and limit or hinder the development of alternatives. In
this way, boards continue to protect.physicians from competition. And, as
the facts which precipitated Andrews indicate, medical professionals are
willing to take action to ensure that protection.43 .
Andrews v. Ballard illustrates how the licensure monopoly insulates the
medical profession from the healthy influences. of consumer preference
which would operate in a more competitive system. The rriastery of medical
science and technology which brought allopathic medicine its brilliant
success and ascendancy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
has arguably become a monomania which is now producing failure and
decline. In its eagerness to embrace science, the profession has abandoned
important aspects of medical practice which are more art than science. In
many cases, the result has been to produce sickness rather than to cure it.
A major part of the old medical art was to think of the patient as a
whole human being and to realize that the patient's sense of well-being was
as much a function of the physician's accessibility, compassion, honesty and
respect as it was a function of medical science. It was part of the old medical
art to realize that the majority of illnesses were properly left to run their
course without aggressive treatment. What the patient needed was to be
put at ease, to be educated as to self-care, and to be told that the physician
was available if further palliative or curative steps became appropriate.
The new medicine is so scientific, technological, and specialized that
the patient as a whole is ignored, and the narrow illness complained of
becomes an enemy that must be stamped out at all costs. One result is that
the physician becomes responsible for producing an alarming amount of
iatrogenic illness in the patients he is trying to cure.44 The side effects of
aggressive treatment with drugs, surgery or hospitalization have produced
what some have called "iatrogenic epidemics."45
42 The plaintiffs have a constitutional right, encompassed by the right of privacy, to
decide to obtain acupuncture treatment. The challenged articles and rules effectively
deprive them of that right, and are not necessary to serve the State's interest in
protecting the patient's health. That being so, they cannot stand.
ld. at 1057.
43 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (physicians'
maximum price-fixing' plan struck down as an antitrust violation).
44 "Iatrogenesis" is "the production of disease by the manner, diagnosis or treatment of a
physician or some other member of the health care team." Editorial, latrogenesis: Just What the
Doctor Ordered, 5 J. OF COMMUNITY HEALTH 149, 149 (1980).
45 Sartwell has catalogued a series of iatrogenic empidemics over the past 50 years. A
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Today's consumers of medical services appear increasingly ready to
assume a greater role in shaping medical practice through the exercise of
intelligent choice. They may not be as willing as they were at the end of the
nineteenth century to trade their autonomy for the promised benefits of
medical science and technology. These benefits, after all, may have reached
a point of _diminishing returns. The string of medical breakthroughs
achieved earlier in this century may have led consumers to believe that the
ultimate defeat of illness was inevitable if only the medical profession were
granted sufficient autonomy, money, and time. This abiding faith may
have peaked on April 12, 1955, when researchers at the University of
Michigan announced the success of the Salk vaccine.
"More than a scientific achievement, the vaccine was a folk vic-
tory," observes Richard Carter in his biography of Jonas Salk.
"People observed moments of silence, rang bells, honked horns,
blew factory whistles, fired salutes, kept their traffic lights red in
brief periods of tribute, took the rest of the day off, closed their
schools or convoked fervid assemblies therein, drank toasts,
hugged children, attended church, smiled at strangers [and] for-
gave enemies." The magic of science and money had worked. And
if polio could be prevented, Americans had reason to think that
cancer and heart disease and mental illness could be stopped, too.
Who knew how long human life might be extended? Medical
research might offer passage to immortality. Between 1955 and
1960, unswerving congressional support pushed up the NIH
budget from $81 million to $400 million.46
Since that time, the continually rising star of the medical profession has
stumbled and stalled. The amount of money lavished upon the profession
has continued to increase astronomically, but the promise of commensu-
rate benefits seems unfulfilled. Despite frequent discussion of imminent
breakthroughs, cancer has not been stopped. At one point cancer was
becoming so prevalent that there was talk of a cancer "epidemic."47 Heart
computerized listing of medical journal citations on iatrogenic reports on surgery
and drugs over a 30~month period uncovered almost 200 articles. They read like a
shelf of gothic novels, a testimony to Murphy's law. One dramatic description of the
extent of iatrogenic illness notes that the number of deaths and nonfatal hospitaliza-
tions directly attributable to medical intervention equals or exceeds the average
number of deaths and nonfatal casualties from either the Korean or Vietnam wars.
Editorial, supra note 44, at 149; see also I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS 270-71 (1976).
46 P. STARII., supra note 8, at 347 (quoting R. CARTER, BREAKTHROUGH: THE SAGA OF JONAS
SALK (1966)).
47 According to present rates, about 66 million Americans now living, or about 30 percent
of the population, will eventually have cancer. It was estimated that in 1983 about 855,000
people would be diagnosed as having cancer. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS AND
FIGURES: 1983, at 3 (1982).
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disease also has not been cured. Indeed, the public's attention has been
diverted towards methods of dealing with cancer, heart disease, and other
threats to health which had been ignored and disparaged by a technology-
prone profession. These methods seek to treat disease through changes in
nutrition, environment, exercise, and life-style.
During the same period a consumer rights movement, combined with
proliferation of lawyers in the United States,48 has helped to"increase the
incidence of medical malpractice litigation. Shocked to discover that physi-
cians were not the faultless miracle workers that the public believed them to
be, jury after jury has awarded extraordinarily large sums in damages to
patients injured iatrogenically. Reports of such cases in the media have
provided the general public with an opportunity to share in the sense of
shock and betrayal. It has become increasingly clear that blind allegiance to
the medical profession provides no guarantee of good health.
The results of this increased consumer involvement in health decisions
and disaffection with the medical profession are apparent. Consumers of
medical services no longer believe that medical science is beyond their ken.
The nineteenth-century disposition towards ,the profession is returning:
consumers feel increasingly able to take responsibility for their own health
and are more willing to take on the challenge of that responsibility. The
new "holistic" medicine, which focuses on the "whole health" of the "whole
person," epitomizes consumers' heightened personal commitments to their
own well-being.4!1
Consumers today are better informed and better able to make their
own medical decisions. "Informed consent" rules have provided consumers
with the right to learn more from their doctors about their own health.50
Educational opportunities in the United States have proliferated in recent
years. 51 The G.I. Bill of Rights which followed World War II began a trend
making higher education available to the masses;52 greater numbers of
48 Law school enrollment in ABA-approved schools rose from 40,381 in 1960 to 82,041 in
1970, and 122,860 in 1979. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION.
49 See Miller & Kellman, How to Clwose a Holistic Practitiuner, WHOLE LIFE TIMES, Nov.,
1983, at 28.
50 Informed consent rules provide a strong incentive to physicians to explain procedures
and potential effects and side effects. See B. HOSFORD, MAKING YOUR OWN DECISIONS 158,
159,174-176 (1982).
51 AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. ANN. 96-122,453 (1981); Warner & Lewis, Trends in Education and
Eamin/{s, 1950-1970; A Structural Analysis, 61 SOCIAL FORCES, Dec. 1982, at 436,443-44. It is
important to note here that the number of adults who ha~e completed four years of high
school or more has increased steadily and dramatically over the past 40 years. In 1950, 36% of
adults had completed high school, while in 1981 the figure had increased to 70%.
52 In 1939, 1,364,815 students were enrolled in four-year institutions of higher learning.
U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FALL ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1954). By 1954, enrollment had risen to 2,499,750, id., arid, by 1960, to
3,610,007. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OPENING [FALL] ENROLLMENT IN
HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1960).
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people now achieve educational parity with the doctors who treat them.
Television has extended its reach into virtually every living room, and
medical themes have pervaded television programming. Consumer advo-
cates have employed television and other media to raise viewers' under-
standing of medicine. Popular magazines such as Prevention and Medical
Self-Care, dealing exclusively with health, abound. Bookstores have estab-
lished separate "Personal Health" sections in order to accomodate the
ever-growing consumer interest.
Upon close examination, then, the justifications for licensure are un-
persuasive. Licensure fails to protect consumers who, for the most part, are
able to protect themselves. More importantly, current licensure schemes
have significant anticompetitive effects.53 Licensure restricts consumer
choice by foreclosing potentially beneficial health care options, and in-
creases health care costs without providing increased quality.
If licensure were ever justified as a means of improving medical care, it
can no longer be so justified. Delegating medical decisions to physicians
may once have been needed to improve public health, but what is needed
now is the return of decision making power to the patient. Denying the
patient that power also denies patients the care which they want, deprives
them of alternative therapies and inflicts avoidable iatrogenic illness. The
patient who cannot choose for himself is also denied the realization of the
physical and psychological benefits which flow from having the patient feel
responsible for his health.
The near future will offer consumers of health care more powerful self-education and
referenlZe tools than ever before. Computer software has been developed to assist health
professionals with diagnosis and treatment.
In medicine, the computer which started by keeping records and sending bills, now
suggests diagnoses. CADUCEUS knows some 4,000 symptoms of more than 500
diseases; MYCIN specializes in infectious diseases; PUFF measures lung functions.
All can be plugged into a master network called SUMEX-AIM, with headquarters at
Stanford in the West and Rutgers in the East .... The process may sound de-
humanized, but in one hospital where the computer specializes in peptic ulcers, a
survey of patients showed that they found the machine "more friendly, polite,
relaxing and comprehensible" than the average physician.
Friedrich, M(Jl:hine of the Year: A New World Dawns, TIME, January 3, 1983, at 14,21. See 000
Pauker & Kassirer, Clinical Decisions Analysis by Personal Cumputer, 141 ARCH. OF INTERN. MED.
1835 (1981); Garry, The Personal Cumputer and Clinical Practice, 141 ARCH. OF INTERN. MED.
1745 (1981). The technology already exists for making these programs available to health care
consumers through low-cost personal computers with modem connections via telephone.
"EstimaIes for the number of personal computers in use by the end of the century run as high
as 80 million." Friedrich, supra at 16. A poll conducted for Time magazine in December, 1982
revealed that nearly four out of five Americans "expect that in the fairly near future, home
computers will be as commonplace as television sets or dishwashers." [d. at 14.
03 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Contra WHITE, PUBLIC HEALTH AND
PRIVATE GAIN 17-24, 120 (1979).
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IV. LIFE WITHOUT LICENSURE
Can medical licensure systems be abandoned? At first blush one might
think that the chances look slim. The twentieth century has witnessed the
development of an intricate set of interlocking institutions for the delivery
of medical services which would complicate any movement toward delicen-
sure.
Two potential sources of complication are the insurance industry and
hospitals. Insurers, such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield, underwrite the
majority of medical bills in the United States.54 Only certain categories of
providers of health care have been recognized as eligible for such reim-
bursement, and "for many non-M.D. practitioners licensure has been the
first hurdle of many hurdles along the road to ... third-party reimburse-
ment."55 If licensure were abandoned, insurers might persist in restricting
the consumer's freedom of choice by refusing payment eligibility to disfa-
vored provider categories. The consumer who is free to choose a nurse-
midwife over an obstetrician, but only at the cost of giving up third-party
reimbursement, is likely to feel less than truly free to choose.
Similarly, delicensure efforts are complicated by the central role hospi-
tals play in twentieth century health care. Hospitals may refuse privileges to
disfavored categories of providers, and thereby deny consumers the oppor-
tunity to receive certain kinds of health services in a hospital setting. Even
the hospital privileges of licensed physicians are sometimes withdrawn to
discourage nonconformist behavior.56
In a deregulated environment, however, both insurers and hospitals
would have incentives to recognize non-M.D. practitioners. These incen-
tives could conceivably outweigh the tendency to discriminate in favor of
physicians. Providers could increase efficiency by delegating medical tasks
to lower-cost personnel within traditional practice areas, as well as experi-
menting with new or unconventional therapies. Likewise, insurers could
favor methods of health care delivery which improve the ratio of cost to
54 Payton & Posner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross and
. Certificate-or-Need, 79 MICH. L. REv. 203, 227-28 (1980). See also Heitler, Antitrust and Third
Party Insurers, 8 AM. ].L. & MED. 251, 252 (1982). .
55]. Thompson, Trends in the Third Party Reimbursement for Non-Physician Health
Care Providers, at 1 (paper delivered at the Licensing and Credentialing of Health Care
Providers Conference, American Society of Law and Medicine, October, 1982).
56 (O)bstetricians at Yale-New Haven Hospital were advised that their admitting
privileges would be revoked if they attended non emergency home births .... The·
reason for the prohibition was obvious: the physicians and hospital wished to squelch
competitive and threatening new modes of delivering care by manipulating admit-
ting privileges.
Dolan. The Law and the Maverick Health Practitioner, 26 ST. LOUIS V.L.]. 627, 645 (1982).
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perceived benefit. They might offer a range of policies which reimburse
alternate treatments or alternate personnel for identical illnesses at a range
of prices. The price of each policy would be a function of the·cost savings
that the insurer believed it would experience as a result of using different
personnel and institutions to provide the care.57
One such policy might require that the consumer take his medical
problems in the first instance to a nurse-practitioner. The nurse-
practitioner would refer the patient to a physician only in those cases where
the problem was' beyond the nurse's independent practice competence.
Cost savings' would result from having such care delivered by nurse-
practitioners instead· of physicians because the former are paid substan-
tially less than the latter for their' services. Nurses also would be much less
. likely than physicians to feel obliged to respond to simple complaints with
costly and risky drugs and therapy,58 and much more likely than physicians
to educate the patient with respect to methods for preventing illness from
recurring.59 Nurses would tend to deliver higher quality medical care in a
manner more responsive to the patient's needs for reassurance, instruction
in self-therapy, education as to etiology, diagnosis, and prognosis, compas-
sion and continuing advice. 60 The demonstrated cost-effectiveness of
nurse-practitioners, nurse-midwives, physicians' assistants, and other
51 To some extent, such options are already offered to consumers. At Boston College, for
example, faculty and staff are currently offered a choice of six health care plans, including five
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) anc~ Blue Cross-Blue Shield. If an employee
chooses an HMO (Harvard Community Health Plan, Lahey Clinic, Multi-Group, Tufts Asso-
ciated, or Bay State), the university contributes the same dollar amount that would be applied
to the corresponding Blue Cross premium. An employee selecting the Harvard Community
Health Plan (HCHP) need only make a contribution of one dollar per month for individual
coverage, as contrasted with $21.25 for Blue Cross-Blue Shield. The employee's monthly
premium for family coverage under the HCHP is $43.47 as contrasted with the Blue Cross-
Blue Shield monthly premium of $99.5 1.. The price differential results from the somewhat
more restrictive approach of the HMOs, which, unlike Blue Cross-Blue Shield, limit the
patient's choice of primary care physician and use of specialists. HMOs also tend to discourage
patients from using hospital emergency rooms by requiring those seeking medical attention
after working hours to call the HMO. Usually patients are counseled to wait until the following
day to visit an HMQ, or are directed to an HMO evening facility. If emergency room care is
necessary, the HMO generally directs the patient to a designated hospital.
58 Nurse-midwifery is becoming increasingly popular and its benefits cannot be under-
estimated.
Avoidance of unnecessary intervention in the birth process, with modern technology
immediately available when really needed, may produce better perinatal outcomes by
eliminating many iatrogenic problems.
Stewart & Clark, Nurse-Midwifery Practice in an In-Hospital Birthing Center, J. OF NURSE-
MIDWIFERY, May/June, 1982, at 21, 25.
59 Fagin, Nursing as an Alternative to High-Cost Care, AM. J. NURSING, Jan. 1982, at 56, 58.
60 Id.; see also Ramsay, McKenzie & Fish, Physicians and Nurse Practitioners: Do They Provide
Equivalent Health Care?, 72 PUBLIC HEALTH BRIEFS 55 (1982).
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non-M.D. health-practitoners6I would promote the reduction of costs, and
heighten patients' perceived satisfaction.62
The use of new or unconventional therapies would also increase in a
deregulated environment. The potential cost savings would provide hospi-
tals with an incentive to liberalize staff privilege policies which might
otherwise stand in the way of reform. Insurers of health care might find it
to their advantage to recognize and reimburse previously prohibited forms
of practice.
It might be argued that a greater use of non-M.D. practitioners in
either traditional or nontraditional practice areas would produce a greater
risk of malpractice liability. Over the last twenty years, hospitals have found
themselves increasingly vulnerable to malpractice liability for the acts of
their medical staff.63 With the gradual erosion of the doctrine of charitable
immunity, hospitals have become liable for the malpractice of their em-
ployees.64 Under a variety of theories, they have become liable as well for
the malpractice of non-employee medical personnel who possess staff privi-
leges.65
To some extent, however, hospitals could tailor their experiments in
non-physician practice without inordinate risk of malpractice exposure. In
medical malpractice cases, practitioners are held to a standard of care
which reflects the knowledge and skills of their particular practice group;66
thus, nonphysicians are not held to the same duty of care as physicians. In a
recent nursing malpractice case in California, for example, the court
judged the adequacy of a nurse's performance "with reference to the
performance of other nurses."67
Thus, a hospital should be able to afford itself maximum protection
from exposure to malpractice liability by making clear to patients precisely
what sort of practitioner will be treating them. Where nothing is said, the
hospital is quite properly held to the standard of what the reasonable
patient would be likely to expect in the absence of notice of special circum-
stances. On the other hand, where a hospital makes clear to a competent,
consenting patient that non-emergency primary care is being delivered in
an out-patient clinic by a nurse practitioner, or other practitioner, and not a
61 Tom, Nurse Midwifery: A Developing Profession, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 262
(1982). .
62 Precisely such practices are now being employed in some free-standing "minor emer-
gency clinics." See, e.g., Martin, The Emergency Care Controversy: Can the New Clinics Pass the
Physical?, MEMPHIS, Sept., 1982, at 81.
63 lIA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Principles of Hospital Liability, ~ 1-2 (1981).
6' lIA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Immunity, ~ 2-7 (1982).
6. lIB HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, Principles of Hospital Liability, ~ 4-1 (1983).
66 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 161-62 (4th ed. 1971) (citations omit-
ted).
67 Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 331, 160 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979).
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physician, the standard of care should be that applicable to the particular
practitioner's speciality,68 and not that applicable to physicians. Such a
result is consistent with the modern informed consent doctrine, which
requires that patients be informed of "all the facts, risks and alternatives
that a reasonable man in the situation which the [hospital] knew or should
have known to be the plaintiff's would deem significant in making a
decision to undergo the recommended treatment."61l
Delicensure would provide strong incentives for increased education
of the public about the risks and benefits of various medical therapies. The
insurer who wished to sell medical insurance policies to prospective buyers
would want to explain why the reduced cost achieved through the use of
nurse-practitioners and other nonphysician health care professionals
would not bring with it reduced quality of care. The same is true of the
hospital that wished to compete in the market by employing non-M.D.
professionals. Moreover, the hospital and the individual health practitioner
who wished to maximize protection from malpractice would want to ex-
plain in as much detail as seems reasonably necessary how they are and are
not holding themselves out to the individual consumer. The consumer also
would be told what, if any, additional risks he might be running by consent-
ing to unconventional treatments, and then could balance the relative risks
and benefits.
Public education and informed consent would be further enhanced in
their role of protecting the consumer interest by a widespread system of
health practitioner certification. Such a system holds the potential for doing
better than licensing much of the work which licensing was designed to do
while avoiding licensing's major pitfalls.
Under a voluntary system of private certification, the various certifying
groups would have a direct financial and professional stake in acting
intelligently and responsibly. Unlike state licensing boards, private certify-
ing groups would face competition. If there were a number of different
certifying groups, the value of each certificate would depend upon the
standards of the group. Neither doctors nor patients would attach much
importance to gaining certification from a group with lax, vague, or un-
sound standards.70
Through public promulgation of their standards, certifying groups
could make clear what skills and results they were holding themselves out
as offering-thus providing the consumer with a generalized basis for
68 Such a standard of care would reflect the expectation, for example, that a nurse-
practitioner know, among other things, when to refer a patient to a phyisician.
6" Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 267, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (1971).
70 Locke, Mode & Binswager, The Case Against Medical Licensing, 8 MEDICOLEGAL NEWS,
Oct. 1980, at 13-14.
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determining when malpractice had occurred.71 Health practItIOners cer-
tified by a particular group could have certification revoked if they regu-
larly departed from the standards of the certifying group. But even if the
government required that every health practitioner be certified by one
group or another, the result need not be as repressive' as that under
licensing. New practitioners would be free to establish their own new
certifying group, with standards that reflected their own approach to
health care, and the consumer of health services would be free to choose
between the new group's practitioners and those of the certifying groups
with which it competed.
Another important effect of delicensure is that the medical consumer
who must choose for himself is likely to be more healthy. People who must
make decisions for themselves become better at making decisions. As Mill
observed:
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of
life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one
of animation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his
faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judg-
ments to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, dis-
crimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and
self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. 72
Experience of the last few years under a legally-mandated regime of
71 The personal representative of the estate of a deceased minor claimed that the minor's
death was caused by the negligence of two Christian Science practitioners who sought to treat
the minor according to the practices of the Church. The plaintiff alleged as one ground for
tort recovery against the Christian Science Church the physicians' departure from the
Church's own medical standards. The plaintiff claimed:
65. That defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs to perform their practitioner work
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Christian Science Church.
66. That the defendants breached that duty in the following particulars:
(a) That neither defendants reported the case of Matthew Swan to the Commit-
tee on Publication.
(b) That defendant, June Ahearn, failed to frequently visit Matthew Swan.
(c) That neither practitioner saw to it that Matthew Swan's case was reported to
the local health official.
(d) That defendant, Jeanne Laitner and defendant, June Ahearn, owed a duty
to send a Christian Science nurse with a card to assess Matthew Swan.
(e) That defendants speculated, and thus engaged in diagnosing, as to the
reason for Matthew Swan's problems, i.e., cutting a tooth, roseola, rheumatic
fever and paralysis.
(f) In failing to consult with a physician on the anatomy involved.
(g) In failing to communicate to the parents any change in Christian Science
policy regarding medical treatment of minor children if in fact there had been
one.
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, May v. Laitner, Mich. CiL Ct., filed Feb. 5, 1980.
72 J. S. MILL, supra note 6, at 56.
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informed consent in medicine tends to bear out Mill's observation. Pa-
tients who are told that they have the ultimate power to choose among
alternative therapies and are fully informed of the relative benefits and
risks of each tend to grow to meet the challenge of the responsibility for
choice.73 Gradually, they begin to ask for additional information and to
educate themselves from other sources. 74 An increased sense of health may
be experienced by individuals simply through feeling in control of their
lives and through being freed of the anxiety which results from believing
that important information is being withheld. 75 Patients tend not to opt for
dearly "medically irrational" alternatives. 76 Indeed, because they under-
stand the rationale behind the prescribed course of therapy and feel them-
selves partners in the therapeutic enterprise, they tend to be more scrupu-
lous in following the course of therapy prescribed. 77 Patients may even
begin to show more concern for their health as a whole-giving up aspects
of an unhealthy lifestyle because they are inconsistent with the enterprise
of maintaining good health which the patient has now taken on as his own
responsibility.
Delicensure would permit patients to choose from among a greater
range of health care schools and systems. Patients would tend to assume
greater responsibility than traditional patients for their own health care
decisions. 78 Such heightened patient autonomy is central to the new "holis-
tic" approach to medicine:
73 See generally Faden, Becker, Lewis, Freeman & Faden, Disclosure ~f Information to Patients
in Medical Care, 19 MED. CARE 718 (1981); Denney, Williamson & Penn, Community Medicine;
Informed Consent: Emotional Responses of Patients, 60 POSTGRAD. MED. 205 (1976); Alfidi, In-
formed Consent: A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J. A.M.A. 1325 (1971).
74 Mazis, Morris & Gordon, Patient Attitudes About Two Forms of Oral Contraceptive Informa-
tion, 16 MED. CARE 1045 (1978); Pratt, Seligmann & Reader, Physician Views on the Level of
Medical Information Among Patients, 47 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1277 (1957).
75 See Denney, Williamson & Penn,supra note 73; Pemberton, Diagnosis: Ca: Should We Tell
the Truth?, BULL. OF THE COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, March, 1971, at II; Skipper and Leonard,
Children, Stress, and Hospitalization: A Field Experiment, 9 J. HEALTH Soc. BEHAV. 275 (1968);
Dumas & Leonard, Effect of Nursing on the Incidence of Postoperative Vomiting, 12 NURS. RE-
SEARCH 12 (1963); Egbert, Battit, Turnadoff & Beecher, The Value of the Postoperative Visit by an
Anesthetist: A Study ofDoctor-Patient Rapport, 185 J. A.M.A. 553 (1963); Abram & Gill, Predictions
of Postoperative Psychiatric Complications, 265 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1123 (1961).
76 See Alfidi, supra note 73.
77 See Faden, Becker, Lewis, Freeman & Faden, supra note 73, at 731; Korsch & Negrete,
Doctor-Patient Communication: Patient Response to Medical Advice, 280 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535
(1969).
78 Telephone interview with Stephen Rechstaffen, M.D., staff physician at the Rhinebeck
Institute and president of the Omega Institute in Rhinebeck, New York (Dec. 14, 1983). This
is not to say, however, that all persons who choose for themselves schools ot systems of
"alternative medical care" display readiness to take on an adult role in the physician-patient
relationship. "Unfortunately, the classic relationship of medical authority figure and obedient
patient ... seems to repeat itself far too often among holistic practitioners and their clients.
Individuals sometimes accept the most far-fetched remedies uncritically, putting themselves
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What we call "holistic" methods are really only "whole" when
taken all together-as an array of options available to us. The only
sane and reliable approach in getting effective help is to maintain
a sense of responsibility for your own healing and well-being-
using those elements of conventional American Medical Associa-
tion medicine, unconventional and non-Western systems, and
anything else that works and is appropriate at a given time. In the
final analysis, there is only one practitioner who can have a truly
holistic perspective on your health and your therapeutic needs-
and that is yourself. 79
Physicians, too, stand to benefit from delicensure. Not only patients,
but also physiCians suffer the negative consequences of the paternalism and
dependency characteristic of conventional doctor-patient relationships.
Though physicians attempt to persuade themselves that "the patient is the
one with the disease,"so "burn-out" occurs even among the strongest physi-
cians.S ! Many physicians complain that they are practicing medicine more
and enjoying it less. If, as claimed, delicensure would produce more adult-
to-adult, collaborative relationships between physicians and patients, physi-
cians might well suffer less burn-out and derive greater satisfaction from
their work. s2 Many physicians already recognize the potential benefits:
unquestioningly in the hands of nutrItIOnists, bodywork therapists, spiritual gurus,
naturopaths, and chiropractors (to mention but a few)---wanting them to be all-knowing and
magically effective." Miller & Kellman, supra note 49, at 28.
79 Miller & Kellman, supra note 49, at 29. As part of their general "consumerist ap-
proach," the authors advise:
Don't be afraid of disappointing or insulting the caregiver with your questions or
decision. The practitioner should not act or be treated as someone who is superior to
you, or has any special power. He is simply someone who has particular expertise and
information that you may want. You are your own healer; the practitioner is your
assistant. (Research is beginning to appear showing that cancer patients who argue
with their doctors and sometimes defy them recover more frequently than patients
who are quiet and obedient.)
[d.
80 S. SHEM, THE HOUSE OF GOD 129 (1978).
81 M. FERGUSON, THE AQUARIAN CONSPIRACY: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN
THE 1980's, at 245 (1980).
82 Under the paternalistic model, the physician-parent takes on ultimate responsibility for
the health of the patient-child. Where the responsibility is shared on an adult-to-adult basis,
the physician is able to feel more relaxed. His role is more limited and success is gauged by a
different standard. He is not a guarantor of outcomes. The patient shares in the responsibility
for the outcome, and the physician merely has to playas well as he can his role of expert
counselor and technician.
In this connection, consider the example of a medical doctor in his early forties who
opened a center for holistic health in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1977. His patients realize
that they take primary responsibility for their health and that he is basically a consultant and
assistant in that enterprise. Much of his work is educational. He publishes leaflets on nutrition,
vitamins, exercise, and preventive self-care, and distributes nutritional supplements and
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so-called "lifestyle" medicine seems to be making its greatest inroads with
the profession's youngest members. 83
VI. CONCLUSION
The medical licensing laws are an intolerable anachronism. They are at
the heart of the current medical care cost crisis, and are the foundation of a
medical regime whose narrow technological focus causes it to forego rich
opportunities to promote general physical and mental well-being. This
narrow focus is linked to increases in iatrogenic illness.
Licensure also stands between consumers of medicine and their power
to control their own health. If the paternalism inherent in such laws ever
produced a net health benefit for consumers, it does so no longer. At the
same time that medical licensure has offered less protection at greater cost,
consumers have become better able and more willing to protect themselves.
Consumers of medical services are not passively awaiting change, but
rather are organizing to bring it about. In a recent issue of Prevention
magazine, the editor announced the formation of a "People's Medical
Society" for the purpose of developing the political power needed to
remove legal roadblocks on the path to complete medical autonomy:
We have within us enormous power to create our own health. In
fact, all but a tiny bit of true health is self-created by the way we
learn to live and think. Yet we have abdicated much of our free-
dom to use self-created health power by adopting the attitude that
medical care delivered from the outside is more powerful. That is
just not true. So we need the People's Medical Society, and other
organizations like it, to help build confidence in our ability to
create new areas of health freedom for ourselves.84
High on the Society's political "hit list" are the medical licensure laws.85
self-care books. He also examines, advises, and offers medical treatment to his patients, They
do not always fully accept the proffered advice or treatment, but that is their choice. He
believes that proper respect for the whole patient requires the doctor to allow the patient to
decide his health questions for himself. This doctor works essentially from 9 to 5 and enjoys a
full personal life along with his professional life.
83 New Physician, the official publication of the American Medical Students Association,
devoted an entire issue in 1977 to alternative practices and has a regular department on
humanistic medicine. Laurel Cappa, who served as AMSA's president in 1976, told a physi-
cians' convention of the students' interest in family practice and in nontraditional approaches
such as meditation and Gestalt psychology. Medical students, she said, want to be partners, not
authority figures, to their patients. M. FERGUSON, supra note 81, at 265.
84 Editorial, Let (Health) Freedom Ring!, PREVENTION, Jan., 1983, at 12.
85 In the same editorial that announced the formation of the Society, its founders called
for repeal of licensure:
Many of our most valuable health freedoms are limited by the medical practice acts of
each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, These laws were originally put on
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Despite the potential benefits, the repeal of medical licensure laws is
not likely to occur without massive resistance from the medical profession.
The recent battle in Congress regarding FTC jurisdiction over the medical
profession86 is compelling evidence that the profession will not yield with-
out a struggle the power, prestige, and monetary wealth which it has come
to regard as its due. Repeal of licensure laws will occur only if consumers of
medical services organize and work diligently to bring it about.
However, such a consumer movement has the potential for finding
allies within the medical profession. There is, after all, a considerable
overlap between the long term self-interest of physicians and that of their
consumers. 87 As citizens, physicians benefit generally from changes in the
social structure which benefit society as a whole. As health professionals,
physicians benefit from any changes in health care delivery likely to pro-
duce better health for their patients. As persons, physicians stand to ex-
perience enhanced health and happiness from any departure from their
paternalistic posture towards their patients. It is not unreasonable, then, to
believe that some portion of the profession might ultimately welcome
delicensure and other consumer health care initiatives.
the books to set standards for the practice of medicine, and thereby protect the public
from people calling themselves doctors who were poorly trained, or who had in-
sufficient skill ....
What you must care about is that all these laws protect a medical monopoly,
which we never needed. and which we especially don't need now. There has been a
turnaround. It is no longer the public that is primarily being protected by the
medical-licensing acts. It is the doctors who are finding shelter behind them. And that
shield takes money out of our pockets and takes the idea of health self-generation out
of our heads.
[d. at 10-11. The Society has recently published a scholarly monograph which makes a strong
case for major overhaul or repeal of medical licensing laws. See 1. ANDREWS, DEREGULATING
DOCTORING: Do MEDICAL LICENSING LAWS MEET TODAY'S HEALTH CARE NEEDS? (1983).
86 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
87 The Americans ... enjoy explaining almost every act of their lives on the principal
of self-interest properly understood. It gives them pleasure to point out how an
enlightened self-love continually leads them to help one another and disposes them
freely to give part of their time and wealth for the good of the state .... Every
American has the sense to sacrifice some of his private interests to save the rest.
A. DE TOCQU~:VILLE, supra note 6, at 498-99.
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